The Euro as symbol and as counter-symbol

Laura Gheorghiu

The Euro as symbol and as counter-symbol

Any past or present currency represents a symbol – of a deity, of a kingdom or, at least, of a certain set of values and principles. Similarly, the Euro stays for a certain political entity – The European Union – but it does not show enough attraction for some of its members. Seven of them opted to stay aside, beyond the obvious benefits they might have through joining and/or despite the prices they have to pay for their reluctance to opt in. The starting assumption is that one should not hide the story under a souverain-ist clause, which is, ultimately false and fully disconnected from reality. Meanwhile, the research hypothesis goes like this: the deep reason for these countries to stay outside the euro-zone is connected to their identity question which must have been somehow disturbed by the way the EU came into being, that is by a federalist project discretely hidden under a functionalist-economic cooperation. While the later was an attractive formula, for the federal idea few politicians were ready to bet, back in 1945 and in all the time since then. By that time, responsible politicians argued for some kind of unification as a remedy to the mass destructions produced during the war, while nationalists could hardly accept their defeat, rather wishing to regain their forces and strike back. The borders between states and/ or nations had proved their volatility if not uselessness and therefore, they were to be abolished if Europeans wished peace and recovery. Yet, such a goal could hardly be achieved in a two-sides fractured Europe which had to wait for the fall of the Berlin wall in order to take this challenge into consideration. However, the joy of German reunification did not come alone on the stage: a renewed fear from the possible power of a Great Germany along with a bunch of Central European states claiming their right to be European were waiting just around the corner. By that time, The European Community was struggling to reform its internal institutional structure but all looked helpless when confronted with the novel reality. If theoretically, the federal route is a safe path, the nations were unprepared to jump in, as it usually works as a one-way road, protecting and sanctioning altogether. None may keep or expect privileges once the federal template gets roots. The question was if the Single Market (already in place), could survive under such a political storm? Following Tommaso P-Schioppa I include the argument of the deep relation between a single market, a monetary union and, respectively, a fiscal union. Since many countries joined the single market seeking its benefits, we may argue that it was a pure nominal step. Some did not feel included, they did not feel as belonging to the Union, hence the need to keep some aspects of sovereignty as a certain degree of freedom of decision. Thus, as long as the Community had only economic standing, all worked well, but once the shift to a political union come to the fora, the sovereign -nist voices raised the barriers against it. Here is the room for a brief discussion about David Mitrany’s functionalist project as well as about his warning against the risks raised by any possible transformation of the Communities into a political entity. He was advocating for a more flexible integration process, separate from the restrictions at hand of the nation-states, while looking for an adaptative market. Such a framework was welcome by the states promising them freedom to adjust besides a growing and deepening integration.

But the nationalist voices behind the statal borders were not ready to accept more than that and reacted as soon as they supposed the paradigm was turning different. I claim that such a moment occurred between the night when the Berlin wall fell down and early 1993 when the Maastricht Treaty entered into force. In order to make my analytical tools more efficient, I have included a social structure proposed and used by László Bruszt and David Stark in their study about regime changes and transitional times. (1992, “Remaking the Political Field in Hungary”). That structure describes a society as consisting of four main groups involved in the change: the hard liners and the soft liners (from the regime to be changed), moderates and reformists (from the paradigm to be installed). In our case, I have considered as previous regime, the one existing in Europe in 1945, immediately after the war, namely an order of national-states while the paradigm-to-come is represented by the European Union. Concretely, the hard liners (HL) are the nationalists, the soft liners (SF) those wishing their countries to join international organizations as inter-governmental forms of cooperation; the moderates would be the functionalists, actors seeking more than bureaucratic forms of cooperation and as radicals I consider the federalists. According to the theory of regime change, such regime changes occur whenever the SL’s reach an agreement with the moderates – which, I claim, was exactly the case in 1957 when the Treaties in Rome were signed. By acting like this, the HL’s remained out of the game, bearing unsatisfaction and need for revenge, while the federalists stepped aside keeping their hope that once the integration mechanism was to be rolling, the European federation would take shape, beyond the public declarations. While in 1957 the European Community all the six member states qualified as SL-Moderates, the subsequent enlargements diversified the picture, adding three HL’s (UK, Denmark, Sweden) and diluting the voice of change. Still, with only two HL by the time of 1992, and “only the European Monetary System” in place, any possible crisis could have been kept under control.

At this point, I argue that it was particularly the “German moment” that triggered a radical change in the approach and functioning of “Europe”. By that time, Helmut Kohl rightly understood that while Moscow was reluctant to let GDR go and the Western partners were afraid of a possible new united Germany, it was the right time for him to ask for the maximum gain. Paying a huge price – the disappearance of the German currency – he managed to unite the country and push it into the European Communities as well as in NATO. For him it was an incredible win, while for Europe and even for the rest of the world, that momentum represented the start of a chain of huge troubles. Raising the interest rates was mandatory in order to counteract the decrease of German mark while the business-as-usual from the Monetary Union got broken. Politicians started to guess it was not “just” about GDR, but lots of Central European countries were to come and knock the door, bearing better credentials than GDR. All of a sudden, politics raised its voice over economics and pushed the dynamics of events incredibly far. I argue that here is to find the crucial moment that waked HL’s up showing them that Europe was to become much more than an economic platform. On the other hand, one may easily notice that it is particularly in these Eastern lands of Germany where the far-right gains votes and support nowadays, along with most of the Central European countries. It is clear that the reforms were not full-fledged implemented and peoples’ minds not really prepared for such a huge step. In the terms defined above, the moderates forgot the window open and the federalists sensed the opportunity to push it, making the boat too inclined for the HL’s not to realize what was really taking place. The new dimensions – and correlative rights – gained by Germany triggered several questions related to the new distribution of mandates and votes within the European Community, the new relations between the Commission and the Parliament as well as the stability of the Monetary Union. In this context Europe had to issue the Maastricht Treaty that re-shaped the entire institutional architecture of the former Community: a common currency, citizenship, subsidiarity, new competences for the European Parliament. Although the word „federal” was excluded from the text, the entire set of reforms brought clear federalist elements in the every-day work of EU.

The new currency – the euro – looked like one without a state (defined by a set consisting of population, territory and legal system). Contrary to the evolution of “natural” states, the EU started with the legislation, moved on expanding and including territories. Even by the time of Maastricht Treaty, the borders were about to fall preparing to include the 1995 wave: Austria, Sweden and Finland. As we already know, this wave consisted of three different states: a frustrated, trouble-maker Austria, a HL Sweden and a SL Finland. However, the hardest “trouble” for EU was the population, which, according to the judgement of the German Federal Constitutional Court, this population was not “a people” to deserve a common citizenship and thus, all the consequent rights and honours of a state’ s population. This way, the EU was not a state, the judgement continued. The euro currency was meant to lead the other way around, namely to strengthen the Monetary Union which was supposed to ground the political union. While such a political logic could be valid, it actually brought into light the core of the new reality: the euro was mainly a political tool, irrespective of its healthy economic roots. I am afraid that here is to find a vicious circle: Central European countries obtained their freedom on behalf of GDR’s geo-position but were not ready to join a political game that ignored their cultural and historical identity. It is not denial here, for sure, but in many decision-making cases, these countries have been supposed to be yes-men instead of partners in a dialogue. Just escaped from COMECON, these countries, their leaders and population altogether were not, mentally prepared to re-gain a secondary-level position elsewhere. On the contrary, their struggle to “return to Europe” supposed gaining equal standing above all else, culture, freedom, communication, opportunities. The very idea of joining a new already created order was too much for that time. The promoters of European integration were, almost all, humanists, seeking the four freedoms and the access to information they lacked so many decades. Nobody taught these societies about the European legal system, nor about the rules and conditionalities of the Monetary Union. Few experts knew in advance to EU joining details about these rules. We may say it was rather a dominant idealism in the region which was easily translated into the enthusiasm of being Europeans again. But once the initial joy evaporated, the real life showed up with its limits and troubles.

At this point, my analysis includes a brief look over the Judgement called “Maastricht Urteil” issued by the German Federal Constitutional Court in order to grasp new useful instruments with which to draft a possible understanding of how states relate to that Treaty and especially to some of its provisions connected to the euro-zone. Alerted by some political parties afraid of the possibility to see a decrease of democracy in Germany, the Court stated that this treaty was not meant to create a European federation and even if some of its institutions, the European Court of Justice before all else would ever try to do that, Germany would not have to bear any new responsibilities before having been analysed and approved by the Court in Karslruhe (Brunner, 101-103). Besides, the Court in Luxembourg will not gain Kompetenz-Kompetenz through the Treaty (Brunner, 94) as the only source of enlarging these Kompetenz belongs to the states (Brunner, 108). It might have been that by stating the above detail, the Court tried to balance its other decisions, but such a paragraph was wildly appreciated by the populists and nationalists of our times – and of any times of crisis. If the ultimate word belongs to the states, then, there are no grounds for the Commission nor for the Council to sanction some states or to order them what to do (Orban or Kaczynski, argued). Besides, the Court outlined, “if an economic union was the only way to make the monetary union, successful, remains a political issue to be decided by the parliaments of the member states.” (Brunner, 103). This way, the functionalist road to create the solid grounds for euro turned political and became vulnerable to the fluid changes in the political will.

This conclusion brings us to ask what does the euro mean for the politicians leading the various member states and what was expected to mean in order to hold the economic union, functional? This brought us to the sensitive topic of political symbolism, rephrasing the question into what kind of symbols does the euro express in the countries who have joined the euro-zone as well as in the defectors. Using Murray Edelmann’s study on political symbols (1985), we learnt that “politics is the process through which the irrational grounds of a society come into light.” That means, one should not search for rational explanations of staying out of the euro-zone, nor for cost-benefit calculus. It is something beyond all these, located deep in one’s identity narrative, in stereotypes, memories or fears. We may easily see our reciprocal stereotypes, of the Westerners about “Eastern Europeans” and the other way around. But such a cheap explanation cannot stand, as long as we have some new-EU countries already members of the euro-zone, like the Baltic states, Slovenia or Slovakia. Something even deeper must be at work, although of some similar nature. Equally valid is the evaluation about euro as a positive or negative symbol, according to the distance that separates the state from the “core Europe”. But not even this idea offers us a proper, comprehensive explanation. Edelman defines the “condensation symbols”, as those encompassing series of emotions associated to a certain political situation or event. In using this kind of symbols, the society does not need to check for validity, nor to compare feelings with reality. Emotions seem to be trustful enough to ground decisions. In their core, they host the fears, the clear senses of threat, the revolts against helplessness and weakness.

The covering umbrella for all these fears is called sovereignty. Politicians as well as their electors withdraw under it, any time they feel unhappy and unable to really change things through rational means like dialogue, negotiations, legal means. Sovereignty can not longer be defined in the classical legal way, as the present-day states belong to various organisations and agreements that limit their freedom of decision both on the international arena and at home; in many cases there are political parties with foreign financing who claim to be sovereigntist. In this respect, sovereignty is no longer the legal institution we were taught in the school but few people are educated enough to understand the inter-dependencies of out times. Moreover, we may find sovereigntists both in the euro-zone and around it, invalidating, thus, any such explanation for rejecting the euro-zone.

With all these being said, one may easily discover French or Spanish over-seas territories being part of the euro-zone, although with their location quite far from the continent, it is hard to think of anybody bringing them troubles. On the contrary, even if the colonial era is over, the symbol of civilisation and a sense of modernity is at work there, perhaps much more than any economic reason. In addition, there are some Western Balkans countries – Montenegro and Kosovo – who opted to turn to the euro-currency, although they are not part of the euro-zone. But again, the symbol and the hope fill in the place of membership and of any kind of duties. There are also four micro-European states who are not EU members but joined the euro-zone to protect themselves and to preserve the feeling of belonging to a certain cultural space, although their tiny economies are far from meeting the conditionalities of a full membership. Even on this ground, we may count seven EU member states who stay aside, not even trying to accelerate the joining procedures and also not being pushed by Bruxelles to do so. What kind of reason could be there, at work?

First of all, we talk about two Western EU monarchies: Denmark and Sweden. Holding each a referendum that rejected the euro currency, they seem to enjoy an outsider position. There is no excuse in being a monarchy, as they are constitutional ones so the currency as a symbol of royalty works as a weak excuse. Besides, there are some monarchies inside the euro-zone. What stroke our attention was their preference for Protestantism – while all the monarchies inside the euro-zone are Catholic. In order to understand the details of this files, I revisited Max Weber’s Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism, and found that while Catholics are more inclined towards austerity and discipline, protestants opt for free initiative and profit. In this case, it can’t be any sovereign-ist clause at work, or, at limit, an axiological one, based on the values and principles achieved in time, rather than a political one.

The other five non-euro countries are in Central and Eastern Europe. Only Czech Republic is protestant. None of them is a monarchy, none is leading the economic tops. Yet, all of them seem to stay comfortable out of euro-zone and no price seems high enough to change their mind. At the time of regime change, there was a huge debate whether these ECE countries to join the euro-zone in no-time and face the difficulties inside the game or, on the other side, to perform their transitions first and adjust to the euro-zone in a second stage. Some of them followed this second route quick– Slovenia, Estonia, Lithuania – others in time. Yet, Hungary and Poland, champions of ECE in the 90’s, are still non-euro states, with Hungary wishing a return to intergovernmental cooperation and Poland being in a domestic transition after the change of power. In order to get some hints, I looked in the work of a well-known historian of this region, namely Istvan Bibo, who in his essay on the “The Miseries of East European Small States” (1946) exposed a credible and useful picture. Speaking mainly about three “countries” – Bohemia, Poland and Hungary – but having in mind the entire ECE, he underlined the “historical traumas” with which these countries come back in the European political arena. Briefly speaking, it is about Sudentenland, in the Czech Case, about several partitions of Poland and, the “crush of the Hungarian War of Independence “ in 1849. The main feature of the Central-Eastern political mindset is the existential anxiety for the community. The Est-European nations have always been in the shadow of a foreign state’s power”, he claimed. Hence, the reluctance to join full-fledged, the double check before any crucial step aside. Besides, in each of these countries, there is a persistent feeling that Europe has to return something, has to pay her debts to these nations. And obviously, all these turn into a low level of trust or desire to give up all the possible layers of independence. I add here Kundera’s consideration about “The Tragedy of Central Europe” as well as the position taken by these countries during the 2015 migrants’ crisis in order to underline the sources of fear, the disenchantment for democracy – which did not help them in crucial moments – and the preeminence of identity question. All of these moments strenghten Bibo’s statement that “Europe had forsaken these three nations in critical situations” (Bibo, 146) and open the possibility for us to identify the deep reason of opting not to join the euro-zone. The essay moves on with saying few words about each of them while bringing quotations from their politicians in power during recent years: Viktor Orban for Hungary, Andrzej Duda for Poland and Milos Zeman and Andrej Babis for Czech Republic. One way or other each of them mentions some sort of discontent with Europe’s position towards his country to explain why they need some room for their own decisions and safety. Since these leaders are not singular voices, but populist ones, heavely voted and supported in their countries, we must take their statements extremely seriously if we really want to grasp the way these societies understand their position in the EU.

Last but not least, Bulgaria and Romania  come with their own sort of traumas, from having been postponed from the 2004 enlargement, for having had the Cooperation and Checks Mechanism to the neverending domestic fight between HL’s and SF’s , between nationalists and “europenists”, keeping these countries in an unhealthy political uncertainty. Additionally, the political class is not keen to explain and argue for any acceleration of joining the euro, either because they have already got tired and powerless or because they, themselves have lost enthusiasm due to their personal life events. There is almost no advocate for the euro, not even for the European mechanisms and rules.

“To rebuild Europe from its ruins and make its light shine forth upon the world, we must first of all conquer ourselves” (W. Churchill, 1948). The bloody experience of the WWII did not convince Europeans to live in a common project, it rather amplified the reciprocal stereotypes, denial, vanities. The fall of the Berlin wall could have been an amazing occasion to erase borders – both physical and menthal – and to move towarsd a united form of Europe. Instead, it brought back the historical demons of everybody, making the efficient dialogue harder and the reinforcement of borders, taxes and limits a game to be played. Even the discussions about the EU internal reform took place around the idea of nation and nation-states. This is why the non-euro countries keep distance and wait for reconciliation or safety. For any currency is a symbol: a positive one when all the players agree to the rules of the game, a negative one, a counter-symbol whenever such rules seem to be broken. It is all about identity and hope, about the need of dialogue or reluctance to join an unfriendly team.